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N August of 1998, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure published for public comment a package of amendments
to the discovery rules developed by the Advisory Committee on Civil
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Cooper for sending me a copy of his 1996 memo to the Advisory Committee. I also wish to
thank the William Hawley Atwell Fund for providing summer research grant support for
the development of this Article.
SMU LAW REVIEW
Rules.' Like virtually all of the discovery rule amendments since the
1980s, the probable impact of these changes, if adopted, will be to curtail
discovery. 2 Why is more change proposed, and why always in the same
direction? Some would undoubtedly argue that we are heading toward a
perfectly efficient, totally neutral set of discovery rules that will create a
world in which an optimal amount of information is exchanged without
any waste and without any claims of "abuse." Alas, such a world will
never come to be. Whether we like it or not, whether we admit it or not,
the harsher reality is that procedural rules allocate power and advantage. 3
Even when written with an intent to be neutral, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure inevitably contain political and distributional consequences. 4
Discovery in particular is an area in which decisions about the scope of
discovery and the process for undertaking it create predictable advan-
tages and disadvantages for predictable types of litigants. And so the Ad-
visory Committee can never expect to arrive at discovery Nirvana when
the lobbying of various interested groups will finally cease because every-
one is satisfied.5
It is not surprising that organized forces have united to argue in favor
of cutbacks in discovery. By limiting discovery, they do not merely strive
to decrease disliked litigation costs. More importantly, their efforts to
limit discovery are intimately tied to efforts to circumscribe enforcement
of disliked substantive law. "Court reform" becomes part of the package
with "tort reform."'6 This group consists in large part of repeat corporate
defendants and their insurers. 7 Casting their pleas as arguments for "effi-
1. The 1998 discovery proposals can be found at <http://www.uscourts.gov.> A hard
copy can be obtained from the Rules Committee Support Office by calling 202-273-1820.
The period for public comment on the proposals extends through February 1, 1999. The
title of this Article is based on Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Specu-
lations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'y REV. 95 (1974).
2. See Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 747-48
(1998) ("[S]ince 1976, proposals for amendment to the rules have generally involved re-
treats from the broadest concept of discovery-in essence to try to contain the genie of
broad discovery without killing it.").
3. See Judith Resnik, The Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2219,2219 (1989) ("1
believe we cannot and should not ignore the political content and consequences of proce-
dural rules.").
4. This does not imply that the rulemakers are motivated by hidden agendas or are
blind to those of others. It just means that any decision about the rules-to amend them or
to leave them alone-will have political consequences whether those consequences are
addressed or ignored, desired or undesired. Cf Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and
Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 761, 775-76 (1993)
("[A] sensible approach would call for consideration of the likely effects of a change, in-
cluding possible gains and losses for identifiable groups. But a neutral approach also im-
plicitly accepts the possibility that uneven impact will be the outcome of certain reforms, so
long as it is not the principal objective.").
5. See Marcus, supra note 2, at 784.
6. See Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 53 (1997).
7. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Learning from the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts
Need Real Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295, 306, 308 (1994) (noting opposition to automatic disclo-
sure rule from products liability defense interests); Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disar-
ray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for
Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1400-24 (1994) (tracing sources and his-
tory of groups urging curtailment of discovery); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory
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ciency," and even defenses of American productivity, these organizations
have lobbied the Advisory Committee for further restrictions on discov-
ery. Perhaps more significantly, they have threatened to go to Congress
for relief, circumventing the usual rules amendment process and further
politicizing the entire world of federal civil procedure.8
Faced with these pressures, with a desire to do something, and with
growing concerns about disuniformity, 9 the Advisory Committee has rec-
ommended limiting automatic disclosure in particular and the scope of
discovery generally. This Article argues that the proposals are unwise
and should be withdrawn by the Committee. Taken together, they would
create new problems in the vast majority of cases in which there currently
are no problems. They would create one-sided advantage, tending to
favor defendants over plaintiffs. And they would not eliminate "abuse"
in the small percentage of problematic cases10 that tend to generate con-
cern about discovery; the causes of those discovery disputes stem from
the incentive structure within the adversary system and the current role
of attorneys in litigation. There is no rule amendment that the Advisory
Committee, no matter how well-intentioned, can implement to eliminate
discovery controversies. The proposed changes are not neutral; they are
not even efficient, and they should be rejected.
I. THE 1998 PROPOSALS IN CONTEXT
The 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure created a system character-
ized by notice pleading, liberal amendment practices, party-controlled
discovery, and broad joinder of claims and parties. During the first few
decades of practice under the rules, the discovery provisions were broad-
Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 538 (1986) ("many defendants (and their
attorneys) in products liability and antitrust cases have championed the curtailment of dis-
covery"); Resnik, supra note 3, at 2219-20; Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural
Rules and the Attributes of a Sound Procedural System: The Case for Presumptive Limits,
49 ALA. L. REV. 79, 89 (1997) (referring to "intensive lobbying efforts of segments of the
business community"); Paul R. Sugarman & Marc G. Perlin, Proposed Changes to Discov-
ery Rules in Aid of "Tort Reform": Has the Case Been Made?, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1465,
1479 (1993) (identifying President's Council on Competitiveness as source of proposals to
limit discovery).
8. See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-1 (West 1997)). The Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990 (CJRA) can also be seen as the result of organized interests going to Congress when
they were unsatisfied with the results of the rulemaking process. The CJRA constitutes
Title I of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990)
and is codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.
9. See, e.g., Charles Alan Wright, Foreword: The Malaise of Federal Rulemaking, 14
REv. LrrIG. 1, 10-11 (1994) (local rules, 1983 amendments to Rule 16, Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990 experiments, and opt-out provisions of Rule 26(a) all contributed to increasing
non-uniformity in federal practice); Daniel J. Meador, A Perspective on Change in the Liti-
gation System, 49 ALA. L. REV. 7, 11 (1997).
10. Empirical research indicates that discovery operates smoothly in most cases and
that those cases with a significant number of discovery disputes are a very small percentage
(generally estimated at about 5%) of large, contentious cases. See generally Linda S. Mul-




ened. In 1948, document production was freed of the requirement that
documents to be discovered must constitute or contain evidence "mate-
rial to any matter involved in the action.""II In 1970, the discovery rules
were rearranged and broadened: documents were discoverable without
the need for a motion and showing of "good cause"; insurance policies
were made discoverable; interrogatories and requests for admission were
expanded to include matters of opinion; and the sanctions provisions
were tightened somewhat.' 2 Those 1970 revisions, however, were the last
to broaden rather than constrict discovery.
Beginning in the 1970s, most notably with the Pound Conference of
1976,13 forces critical of discovery as it existed, or was perceived to exist,
began to mobilize. This repeated expression of concern spurred what
Professor Rick Marcus has identified as two "rounds" of discovery con-
tainment.' 4 The first round, in the 1980s, led to a mandate for increased
case management, a requirement that discovery requests be signed to cer-
tify compliance with the rules, and a specific provision allowing judges to
limit discovery to an amount proportionate to the dispute involved in the
lawsuit.' 5 The second round resulted in the 1993 amendments to the dis-
covery rules. These amendments created automatic disclosure provisions
as to facts alleged with particularity, required an early conference to de-
velop a discovery plan, and created new presumptive limits on interroga-
tories and depositions.16
11. 8A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2201 (2d
ed. 1994).
12. Advisory Committee's Explanatory Statement Concerning Amendments of the
Discovery Rules, in Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relat-
ing to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 487-88 (1970).
13. The Pound Conference was convened on the seventieth anniversary of Roscoe
Pound's famous speech at the 1906 ABA Convention. See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 REP. OF THE A.B.A. 395
(1906). For an overview of the concerns expressed at the 1976 Conference, see Addresses
Delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice (April 7-9, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976).
14. See Marcus, supra note 2, at 753-68. Professor Marcus is currently Special Re-
porter to the Discovery Subcommittee of the Rules Advisory Committee and drafter of the
proposed amendments.
15. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the U.S., Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 90 F.R.D. 451 (1981). For a general discussion of the 1983 changes, see Richard L.
Marcus, Reducing Court Costs and Delay: The Potential Impact of the Proposed Amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 66 JUDICATURE 363 (1983).
16. For the Committee's proposals as of 1991, see Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137
F.R.D. 53, 87-135 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Draft]. For a discussion of the rules as ulti-
mately adopted and the surrounding controversy, see Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)-"Much Ado About Nothing,?" 46 HASTINGS
L.J. 679 (1995). See also Marcus, supra note 2, at 783 (summarizing the changes in the




We are now faced with a third round17 of proposed discovery cutbacks.
This part of the Article sets out the significant changes that have been
proposed. 18 These proposals would cut back on automatic disclosure but
eliminate the local opt-out provision, redefine (and narrow) the scope of
discovery generally, and impose a new presumptive time limit on each
deposition.
A. AUTOMATIC DISCLOSURE
1. The 1993 Disclosure Rules
The Advisory Committee began to address, once again, concerns about
the "abuse" of discovery in 1990. In an effort to decrease cost and in-
crease information flow, the first version of an automatic disclosure re-
quirement aimed to "materially reduce the cost of discovery before trial"
by reducing the reliance on discovery devices to obtain information. t9
The Committee, like the sub-committee's Reporter, may have realized
"that in too many instances parties play hide-the-ball with basic informa-
tion despite broad discovery. '20 The initial proposal required the parties
to disclose the names of "persons known to have personal knowledge of
any fact alleged in any pleading" and information on documents "bearing
on any fact alleged in any pleading filed," evidence on which damage
claims are based, and information on insurance coverage. 21 By August
1991, the proposal had been narrowed to require basic disclosure only of
persons or documents "likely to . . . bear[ ] significantly on any claim or
defense. '22 The Committee Notes accompanying the draft indicated that
automatic disclosure was not intended to change the scope of discovery.
Rather, the rule was intended to "accelerate the exchange of basic infor-
mation . . . and to eliminate the paperwork involved in requesting such
information. ' 23 The disclosure requirements were said to be the "func-
tional equivalent of standing interrogatories. '24
Nevertheless, the proposal generated a flood of opposition, the bulk of
which came from the defense side.25 The Advisory Committee reacted to
the complaints by limiting the disclosure requirement still further. As
sent to the Supreme Court and Congress for approval, the rule requires
17. Or maybe the 1998 proposals are more properly considered as a continuation of
round two. However we label it, the Committee is again proposing that discovery be
constricted.
18. The proposals also include several technical changes.
19. Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the
Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 803 (1991); see also id. at 858-61 (reprinting
March 8, 1980, Reporter's Draft Rule 25.1 with Reporter's Note and Advisory Committee
Note).
20. Marcus, supra note 4, at 805.
21. Mullenix, supra note 19, at 858-59.
22. 1991 Draft, supra note 16, at 87-88. The provisions regarding damages and insur-
ance were retained.
23. Id. at 99 (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 100.
25. See Marcus, supra note 4, at 808. The proposal was also opposed by plaintiffs'
lawyers and by academics. See id. at 808-09.
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disclosure only of information and documents "relevant to disputed facts
alleged with particularity in the pleadings. '26 The amended proposal
continued to draw opposition through the remainder of the rulemaking
process. The Supreme Court sent the proposal to Congress with tepid
support, 27 and the House Judiciary Committee immediately held hearings
during which opponents urged Congress to eliminate the mandatory dis-
closure requirements. The House passed such a bill,28 but the Senate ran
out of time and did not. The mandatory disclosure rules therefore be-
came effective on December 1, 1993.29 Also part of the package, the
Committee adopted presumptive limits on the number of interrogatories
(twenty-five, including subparts) and number of depositions (ten per side,
including third-party defendants) that could be used by the parties absent
agreement or court order.
Why the intense opposition to a rule that the Committee represented
as a minor change in timing and paperwork? On the one hand, the dis-
closure provisions were opposed by the insurance and corporate defense
lawyers30 who feared that the disclosure regime would force them to dis-
close too much. No longer would lawyers trying to evade discovery be
able to rely on their opponent's failure to draft requests with unavoidable
specificity. One AT&T in-house lawyer complained that disclosure elimi-
nates the ability to benefit from an opponent's mistakes: "You're giving
up chips that would never have been put on the table. There's no substi-
tute for good lawyering, and this helps bad lawyers who don't have the
discipline or competence to draft appropriate requests."13' At bottom, the
requirement of automatic disclosure seemed to them incompatible with
litigator culture, an understanding of the "adversary system," including
discovery, as a process in which the only operative value is aggressive
assertion of the interests of the client. At least some lawyers believe that
they are entitled to receive the benefits of good lawyering at the expense
of reaching a just result. Discovery is not an island of cooperation in a
26. 1993 Amendments, 146 F.R.D. 401, 431 (1993).
27. Chief Justice Rehnquist's transmittal letter to Speaker Foley states that the trans-
mittal indicates that "the Court is satisfied that the required procedures have been ob-
served" but notes that "this transmittal does not necessarily indicate that the Court itself
would have proposed these amendments in the form submitted." H.R. Doc. No. 103-74
(1993), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401,403 (1993). Justice Scalia wrote a dissent to the amend-
ments, joined by Justices Thomas and Souter, principally on the ground that automatic
disclosure would require attorneys to produce information damaging to their clients.
By placing upon lawyers the obligation to disclose information damaging to
their clients-on their own initiative, and in a context where the lines be-
tween what must be disclosed and what need not be disclosed are not clear
but require the exercise of considerable judgment-the new Rule would
place intolerable strain upon lawyers' ethical duty to represent their clients
and not to assist the opposing side.
Id. at 511.
28. See H.R. 2814, 103d Cong. (1993).
29. See Randall Samborn, Rules for Discovery Uncertain, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 20, 1993, at
1.
30. See Sorenson, supra note 16, at 726 n.170.




sea of adversariness, but a part of the adversarial tide. Any rule that
requires cooperation instead is not going to be welcomed by those who
benefit from a lack of disclosure.
The automatic disclosure rules were also opposed by segments of the
plaintiffs' bar, but for different reasons. Again reflecting the adversarial
culture, the plaintiffs' bar tended to oppose automatic disclosure because
they feared it would result in less information being discovered. First,
since the rule as adopted limits the automatic disclosure duty to facts
pleaded with particularity, plaintiffs will be provided information only in
areas in which they are able to allege specific facts before filing suit. For
information-poor plaintiffs, this may not be much help. Such plaintiffs
will not be able to plead facts with particularity, will therefore not get
related initial disclosures, and will nevertheless have seen their access to
formal discovery tools limited in number. Second, plaintiffs' lawyers fear
that disclosure by plaintiffs may allow evasive defendants to shape formal
discovery so as to further avoid disclosing information to plaintiffs.
Another plaintiffs' concern is the opportunity provided by automatic
disclosure for an additional opportunity for disputes and delay. Those
who benefit by delaying discovery could find themselves with a new
source of delay-disputes over disclosures. On the whole, delay tends to
benefit defendants rather than plaintiffs. 32
Further anxiety relates to the long-run shape of civil litigation. "One
fear is that this proposal is an ice-breaker for the abolition of discovery.
Some judges seem willing to reinforce that fear."' 33 Some lawyers see ini-
tial disclosure by plaintiffs as a disguised return to fact pleading and a
world in which lawsuits can only be brought by those with pre-filing ac-
cess to all important facts. 34 These concerns are also supported by sug-
gestions that the disclosure rules will work together with Rule 11 and lead
to the dismissal (with sanctions) of lawsuits when plaintiffs lack adequate
evidence before filing. 35
Lawyers and clients unhappy with the 1993 rules urged federal district
courts to exercise their right to "opt out" of the automatic disclosure
rules.36 Numerous districts have done so or have adopted automatic dis-
closure rules that differ from the Rule 26(a) model. This has added a
32. See Galanter, supra note 1, at 121 (delay favors the party in possession); THOMAS
W. CHURCH, JR. ET AL., PRETRIAL DELAY: A REVIEW AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 12-13 (1978)
(defendants can benefit from delay by postponing necessity to pay and by increasing
chances that the passage of time will impair the quality of evidence and make it more
difficult for plaintiff to meet burden of proof).
33. Marcus, supra note 4, at 811, (citing Wauchop v. Domino's, 143 F.R.D. 199, 200
(N.D. Ind. 1992)).
34. See, e.g., Transcript of the "Alumni" Panel on Discovery Reform, 39 B.C. L. REV.
809, 813 (1998) [hereinafter Alumni Panel].
35. See id. (quoting Judge Schwarzer, an influential rule reformer); see also William W.
Schwarzer, New Discoveries for the Discovery Process, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 25, 1991, at 25.
36. See, e.g., Denis F. McLaughlin, Your Guide to Amended Rules of Civil Procedure,
N.J. LAW., Jan. 10, 1994, at 1 (describing pressures for district to opt out or modify rule);
Jaret Seiberg, Rule Wrangling, CONN. L. TRIB., Jan. 24, 1994, at 3 (pressure by lawyers for
district to opt out or modify rule); Daniel Wise, 3 Bar Groups Seek Delay in Federal Dis-
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problem of non-uniformity on the national level (information must be
disclosed in some districts but not in others) in addition to the benefits or
burdens associated with the disclosure rule itself.
2. The Proposed 1998 Disclosure Limitations
The same pressures that caused controversy to flow around the 1993
proposal, along with the concerns about disuniformity, have led the Advi-
sory Committee to once again take up the issue of disclosure and its rela-
tionship to formal discovery. After two academic conferences 37 and
other input from interested groups such as the Defense Research Insti-
tute,38 the Committee has proposed the following redefinition of the dis-
closure requirement (with changes indicated):
(1) INITIAL DISCLOSURES. Except in categories of proceedings speci-
fied in subparagraph (E),39 or to the extent otherwise stipulated or
directed by order r local ru4a-, a party shall, without awaiting a dis-
covery request, provide to other parties:
(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of
each individual likely to have discoverable information supporting its
claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment re........ t 'o
l tt a~t llegedt ,with par-t! antyr in th. ple lng, identifying the
subjects of the information;
(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all docu-
ments, data compilations, and tangible things that are in the posses-
sion, custody, or control of the party and that support its claims or
covery Changes, N.Y. L.J., June 9, 1994, at 1 (defense bar organizations try to get New
York area federal courts to postpone automatic disclosure).
37. One was at the University of Alabama and one in San Francisco. The ABA Sec-
tion on Litigation also sponsored a conference at the University of Alabama, and the Advi-
sory Committee held a meeting there. Some of the papers and proceedings are reprinted
in 49 ALABAMA LAW REVIEW number 1 (1997) and 39 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
number 3 (1998).
38. The DRI is a national organization of defense lawyers. See Alumni Panel, supra
note 34, at 835 (1998) (DRI proposal for limiting discovery characterized as "not plaintiff
friendly"). The conference also heard from the ABA Section of Litigation, the American
College of Trial Lawyers, the American Trial Lawyers Association (a national organization
of plaintiffs' lawyers), Trial Lawyers for Public Justice (a non-profit, public interest law
firm), and the Products Liability Advisory Council. See Paul V. Niemeyer, Here We Go
Again: Are the Federal Discovery Rules Really in Need of Amendment? 39 B.C. L. REV.
517, 522 (1998). For information about the various entities, see ENCYCLOPEDIA OF As-
SOCIATIONs at 555, 588 (32d ed. 1997) and The Product Liability Advisory Council: Who
We Are and What We Do, MET. CORP. COUNSEL (Jan. 1998).
39. Subparagraph (E) exempts from initial disclosure certain categories of cases
thought to involve little or no discovery: an action for review on an administrative record; a
petition for habeas corpus or other proceeding to challenge a criminal conviction or sen-
tence; an action brought without counsel by a person in the custody of the United States, a
state, or a state subdivision; an action to enforce or quash an administrative summons or
subpoena; an action by the United States to recover benefit payments; an action by the
United States to collect on a student loan guaranteed by the United States; a proceeding
ancillary to proceedings in other courts; and an action to enforce an arbitration award. See
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Evidence, Request for Comment, 36-37 (Rule 26, lines 38-52) (1998) <http://
www.uscourts.gov> [hereinafter 1998 Discovery Proposals]. Collectively, these cases rep-
resent a large proportion of the civil caseload of federal district courts.
1998 DISCOVERY PROPOSALS
defenses, unless solely for impeachment that arerelevant to disputd
facts alleged uith Particularity in the pleadings 4 0
Courts' ability to opt out by local rule or standing court order is elimi-
nated. However, parties in individual cases can ask for special treatment.
The disclosures are to be made within fourteen days after the initial con-
ference (absent stipulation or court order) unless "a party objects during
the conference that initial disclosures are not appropriate in the circum-
stances of the action and states the objection in the subdivision (f) discov-
ery plan. In ruling on the objection, the court must determine what
disclosures-if any-are to be made, and set the time for disclosure. 4 1
The Committee Notes cite the importance of ending the opt out experi-
ment and adopting a uniform national rule. On the merits, the Notes em-
phasize that under the proposed rule a party "is no longer obligated to
disclose witnesses or documents that would harm its position" and that
"[blecause the disclosure obligation is limited to supporting material, it is
no longer tied to particularized allegations in the complaint. '42
B. SCOPE OF DISCOVERY
1. Background to the 1998 Proposals
The kind of concern about broad discovery expressed at the Pound
Conference also led to the creation of a Special Committee on Abuse of
Discovery by the American Bar Association (ABA) Section of Litiga-
tion.43 This Special Committee issued a report, which was officially ap-
proved by the ABA Board of Governors in December, 1977. 44 Among
these proposals was a redefinition of the scope of discovery, narrowing it
to material "relevant to the issues raised by the claims or defenses of any
party. ''45 In 1978 the Advisory Committee initially proposed an amend-
ment to so restrict the scope provisions, but substituted language that the
Committee thought would be somewhat clearer: "relevant to the claim or
defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any
other party."'46 After facing significant opposition, including Professor
Charles Alan Wright's comment that the proposals were "hasty solutions
to what may or may not be problems, '47 the Advisory Committee with-
drew its proposal to narrow the scope of the discovery. This proposal did
40. Id. at 34-35 (Rule 26, lines 3-22).
41. Id. at 37-38 (Rule 26, lines 59-64).
42. Id. at 50.
43. See Marcus, supra note 2, at 753-54.
44. See Second Report of the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse, 92
F.R.D. 137 (1977).
45. Marcus, supra note 2, at 754 n.38.
46. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 77 F.R.D. 613, 623 (1978). Professor Bernard Ward, the Reporter at the time, op-
posed the change and also did not like the term "issues." Marcus, Redux, supra note 2, at
756 n.47.
47. Marcus, supra note 2, at 759. The Advisory Committee also abandoned the pro-
posed revision because a 1978 empirical study by the Federal Judicial Center demonstrated
that discovery activity was limited in most cases. See Mullenix, supra note 7, at 1435.
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not die, however. In 1989 a section of the New York Bar Association
resurrected the concept. 48 The Committee again rejected it. Some Com-
mittee members thought that the change would make no real difference.
Some thought that it might require fact pleading, and it was noted that
the original proposal was strongly opposed by the plaintiffs' and civil
rights' bars. The proposal to change to "claims and defenses" language
had no supporters. 49 The current version of the scope limitation proposal
comes from the American College of Trial Lawyers (ACTL).50 The very
persistence of the suggestion is sometimes taken as an indication that
Rule 26's current language, "relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the
party," is in fact the source of discovery problems. 5'
2. The 1998 Proposals
The 1998 proposed amendments would signal a narrowing of discovery
in three ways. First, the basic definition of relevance is changed. Discov-
ery would be available for matters "relevant to the claim or defense of
any party."152 The language referring to "subject matter involved in the
pending action" is omitted.53 "Subject matter" discovery is available only
if a party can show "good cause." 54 Second, the provision for discovery
of non-admissible information is re-drafted to suggest limits. It would be
revised as follows: "Relevant The information sught need not be admis-
sible at the trial if the discovery information sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. '55 This
amendment was prompted by the Committee's concern that the "reason-
ably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence" standard
of the current rule "might swallow any other limitation on the scope of
discovery."'56 Therefore, the proposed amendment emphasizes that the
non-admissible information must itself be "relevant" as defined. Third, in
48. See Committee on Discovery, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Section on Commercial and
Fed. Litig., Report on Discovery Under Rule 26(b)(1), 127 F.R.D. 625, 634-38 (1989).
49. Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, Civil Rules Committee Minutes 9 (Nov.
17-18, 1989), quoted in Marcus, supra note 2, at 776 n.153.
50. See Niemeyer, supra note 38, at 519. Judge Niemeyer sits on the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals and is currently Chair of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee. The
ACTL was apparently invited to submit the proposal by former Advisory Committee Chair
and Fifth Circuit Judge Patrick Higginbotham. See Federal Rules Committee Plans to Re-
view Discovery Quagmire, FEDERAL DISCOVERY NEws, Nov. 1996, available in LEXIS,
Legnew Library, Allnws File. (Higginbotham asked the ACTL to address the subject of
"tightening up the scope and sweep of discovery relevancy under Rule 26(b)") [hereinafter
Quagmire].
51. Niemeyer, supra note 38, at 520 ("[l]t is the persistence of complaints and ques-
tions about the merit of broad discovery and its expense that, at bottom, has caused the
Committee to take another look.").
52. 1998 Discovery Proposals, supra note 39, at 41-42 (Rule 26, lines 122-26).
53. Id. at 41 (Rule 26, lines 123-24).
54. Id. at 42 (Rule 26, lines 130-32). "Good cause" is not defined, and the Committee
Notes indicate that the good cause standard is meant to be "flexible." Id. at 56.
55. Id. at 42 (Rule 26, lines 132-36).
56. Id. at 56.
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case judges did not already realize that these amendments are intended to
limit discovery, the proposal adds a gratuitous cross-reference to the pro-
portionality requirements already contained in the very next section of
Rule 26(b)(2) stating that "[a]ll discovery is subject to the limitations im-
posed by subdivision (b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii). ' '57 The Committee Notes
indicate that the Committee has been "told repeatedly" 58 that the pro-
portionality limits have not been used with sufficient "vigor"and cite a
Supreme Court case noting that Rule 26 as it exists "vests the trial judge
with broad discretion to tailor discovery narrowly. ' 59 The Committee
therefore recommends what it knows to be a "redundant" cross
reference .60
C. 1998 PROPOSALS LIMITING SPECIFIC DISCOVERY DEVICES
As noted above, the 1998 proposals keep in place and make mandatory
the presumptive limits on numbers of depositions and numbers of inter-
rogatories imposed in 1993. This is done despite the original tie between
automatic disclosure and discovery limits. 61
The new package of proposed amendments also contains new limits on
depositions and document production. The deposition limit revives a
proposal that failed in the past-a presumptive time limit for depositions.
The Advisory Committee had initially proposed in 1991 that depositions
be limited to six hours. 62 That limit was later deleted, although the Com-
mittee did add limitations on obstructionist conduct during depositions.63
The 1998 proposal states that "[ulnless otherwise authorized by the court
or stipulated by the parties and the deponent, a deposition is limited to
one day of seven hours. '64 The court retains its authority to allow addi-
tional time "if needed for a fair examination of the deponent" or if some-
thing "impedes or delays the examination. '65 The Committee Notes
indicate that the party seeking a court order to extend a deposition or
57. Id. at 42 (Rule 26, lines 136-38).
58. Id. at 57. The Note does not indicate by whom it has been told, although it cites
the Wright & Miller treatise.
59. Crawford-El v. Britton, - U.S. -, 118 S. Ct. 1584, 1597, 140 L.Ed. 2d 759, 779
(1998).
60. In order to further national uniformity, Rule 26(b)(2) would also be amended to
remove the previous permission for local rules or standing orders that establish different
presumptive limits on number of depositions and interrogatories than those contained in
Rules 30, 31, and 33. Thus local districts cannot establish local rules allowing either greater
or smaller numbers of interrogatories or depositions without orders directed to specific
cases. Rule 26(b)(f) would be amended to remove the prior authority to exempt cases by
local rule or standing order from the discovery conference requirement.
61. The limits were justified on the ground that the information provided in initial
disclosures would make more extensive formal discovery generally unnecessary. See Car-
rington, supra note 7, at 305; Sugarman, supra note 7, at 1478; Alumni Panel, supra note 34,
at 835 (quoting Magistrate Brazil).
62. See 1991 Draft, supra note 16, at 68.
63. These provisions are now contained in Rule 30(d). For a discussion of the earlier
Committee's reasons for rejecting the time limit proposal, see Marcus, supra note 2, at 767
n.111.
64. 1998 Discovery Proposals, supra note 39, at 60 (Rule 30, lines 11-13).
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2). Permission for variants by local rule is again eliminated.
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otherwise alter the limits "is expected to show good cause to justify such
an order" and optimistically note that "[pireoccupation with timing is to
be avoided."166
The proposed amendment to document production rules also parallel
an earlier request from portions of the bar. The Council on Competitive-
ness suggested that the cost of document production after initial disclo-
sure should be borne by the requesting party. 67 The 1998 amendments
would not be so severe, but would make clear the trial court's authority
to condition document production on payment by the party seeking dis-
covery of part or all of the costs of the production. 68 Specifically, the
Committee proposes adding the following sentence to Rule 34(b): "On
motion under Rule 37(a) or Rule 26(c), or on its own motion, the court
shall-if appropriate to implement the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(i),
(ii), or (iii)-limit the discovery or require the party seeking discovery to
pay part or all of the reasonable expenses incurred by the responding
party. "69
II. "ABUSE" AS A TWO WAY STREET: WHAT THE
COMMITTEE HAS NOT PROPOSED
All of the 1998 proposed amendments assume that the source of "dis-
covery abuse" is over-discovery: parties trying to extract from their oppo-
nents more than they are entitled, or more than a cost/benefit analysis
would warrant. Nowhere in the proposals are changes designed to limit
abusive resistance to discovery, even though empirical research has con-
sistently identified resistance as a bigger problem than overbroad re-
quests. 7° For example, the empirical research commissioned by the
Advisory Committee and done by the Federal Judicial Center reported
that the most common problems in document production were failure to
respond adequately and failure to respond in a timely fashion.71 Never-
theless, it is doing discovery rather than resisting discovery that the Com-
mittee proposes to limit. This part of the Article briefly examines roads
that the Committee has not taken.
66. 1998 Discovery Proposals, supra note 39, at 63.
67. See Sugarman, supra note 7, at 1479 (citing President's Council on Competitive-
ness, Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America 17 (1991)).
68. The Committee Notes suggest that authority to shift costs to the party seeking
discovery is already implicit in Rule 26(b)(2).
69. 1998 Discovery Proposals, supra note 39, at 65-66 (Rule 34, lines 23-28).
70. See, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its
Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787, 829 (1980); Joseph L.
Ebersole & Barlow Burke, DISCOVERY PROBLEMS IN CIVIL CASES 44-47 (1980) (defend-
ant's opposition to discovery often unfounded); Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wig-
gins, Empirical Research on Civil Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785, 800 (1998) (citing
Columbia Project for Effective Justice).
71. See Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure




Some situations, such as single-accident mass disasters, products that
are alleged to injure large numbers of people, or insurance policies or
other investments that are alleged to be fraudulently sold, lead to large
numbers of lawsuits that revolve around the same set of facts. These mul-
tiple lawsuits, if not joined or coordinated, will result in multiple overlap-
ping sets of discovery requests. Under the present rules, plaintiffs are
required to formulate their own discovery requests, have their own dis-
covery disputes, and independently acquire their own information. In
settling a case, a plaintiff and defendant can bargain for the return and
confidentiality of the discovery materials.72 Professor Carrington pro-
posed to the Advisory Committee a rule limiting such redundant discov-
ery by creating discovery rules that "generally obligate parties to produce
discovery materials produced in other like cases even if those cases were
resolved short of trial."73 Carrington structures his proposal as part of
the automatic initial disclosures, which he converts to standard
interrogatories. 74
This kind of discovery rule would cut discovery costs and delay by elim-
inating duplication of effort. It would limit the ability of parties who seek
to avoid or prolong discovery to require their opponents to repeatedly
file motions to compel discovery that other courts have already ordered.
It would generally result in the production of "core" information early on
and without the need for formal discovery requests. It is likely that such
a rule would therefore favor plaintiffs rather than defendants, at least in
mass tort, securities, and consumer litigation. 75 Yet the Advisory Com-
mittee has not recommended this change.
B. RULINGS AND SANCTIONS
Another consistent theme in lawyer responses to empirical research is
the lawyers' desire for judges to rule promptly on discovery disputes and
to impose sanctions on offending parties more often.76 The most recent
study by the Federal Judicial Center, done specifically for the Advisory
Committee, is no exception. When given a list of thirteen changes that
might reduce litigation costs, attorneys most often chose increasing the
72. See, e.g., Short v. Western Elec. Co., 566 F. Supp. 932 (D.N.J. 1982).
73. Carrington, supra note 6, at 72.
74. See id. at 75 (Appendix, proposed Rule 26(a)(3)(C)): "Are there documents, data,
compilations, or tangible things in your possession, custody, or control that are relevant to
disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings? If so, provide a copy or a de-
scription by category and location.").
75. See Carol M. Rice, The Civil Justice Reform Act Conference: A Reporter's View, 49
ALA. L. REV. 265, 275 (1997). Professor Carol Rice reports in her summary of breakout
sessions in the CJRA Conference that defense counsel in particular opposed a rule that
would prohibit agreements to destroy discovery materials on settlement. See id.




availability of judges to resolve discovery disputes. 77 Imposing sanctions
more frequently and severely placed third, with forty-two percent of at-
torneys responding that such action might reduce litigation costs. 78 This
suggestion is echoed by experienced federal judges such as Patrick Hig-
ginbotham, immediate former Chair of the Advisory Committee: "Now
there is a serious problem with regard to access to judges. If a judge
makes himself available by phone, and it's known, and he has a reputa-
tion for quickly resolving . . . disputes, a lot of those problems will go
away."' 79 Similarly, Paul Carrington, a former Advisory Committee Re-
porter, has recommended prompt judicial rulings as a cure for discovery
ills.
[T]he Rules might wisely provide that motions respecting discovery
shall, unless otherwise specifically ordered, be made orally and ruled
upon "forthwith." Judges who effectively and promptly enforce
rights with respect to discovery are much less likely to be burdened
with frequent interruptions of their work by frivolous discovery dis-
putes than those who take such motions under advisement and await
opportunities to read briefs and transcripts of depositions.80
More judges ruling on (as opposed to managing) 81 discovery disputes
faster seems to be an evenhanded reform, desired by the bar and recom-
mended by eminent proceduralists. It could cut down on unfounded
resistance to discovery as well as overdiscovery. But no such amendment
to the Rules was proposed by the Advisory Committee, either in the form
of a provision for oral motions or a deadline for judicial action. Nor were
the sanction rules amended.82 This kind of approach, which would ad-
dress abusive evasion, was not what the Committee was looking for.
77. Fifty-four percent of attorneys responding chose this option. Nor was there a sta-
tistically significant difference in the number of plaintiff and defense lawyers finding this
attractive. See Willging, supra note 71, at 542. The choices they were given were: adopting
a uniform national rule requiring initial disclosure; deleting initial disclosure from the na-
tional rules; narrowing the definition of what is discoverable; narrowing the definition of
what documents are discoverable; limiting or further limiting the time within which to com-
plete discovery; limiting or further limiting the number of depositions; limiting or further
limiting the maximum hours for a deposition; limiting or further limiting the number of
interrogatories; increasing court management of discovery; increasing availability of dis-
trict or magistrate judges to resolve discovery disputes; imposing fee-shifting sanctions
more frequently and/or imposing more severe sanctions for violations of discovery rules or
orders; adopting a civility code for attorneys; and others. In fact, the desire for greater
availability of judges was the only proposed change to have as much as 50% support. See
id.
78. See id. at 585.
79. Alumni Panel, supra note 34, at 817.
80. Carrington, supra note 6, at 64-65. ("Because delays in ruling create incentives for
counsel to bicker over trifling discovery issues, judges who do not rule quickly make more
work for themselves while imposing costs on the parties.").
81. The Federal Judicial Center study found that judges were more likely to have
helped to plan discovery than to have decided discovery motions or ruled on sanctions. See
Willging, supra note 71, at 580.
82. It is true that the authority to sanction already exists in Rule 37, and arguably no
change is necessary. But the same was true of the proportionality limits on the scope of




This, then, is a summary of what the Advisory Committee did and did
not recommend. Taken together, it aims to force trial judges to limit dis-
covery more than has been the case. The proposals cut back on initial
disclosure, cut back on the scope of discovery, cut back on the availability
of individual discovery devices, and do nothing to address the problem of
discovery avoidance. The remainder of this Article will analyze the pro-
posed amendments. Who wants them? What does empirical research tell
us about the need for them? What is their likely effect?
III. WANTING, NEEDING, AND THE
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
A. WHO WANTS TO LIMIT DISCOVERY?
As Professor Marcus has recently reminded us, "in a world in which
proposals do emanate from interest groups and some players are focused
on their private advantage, it would be foolish to disregard motivation as
a hint about both the desirability and likely impact of proposals for
change."'83 While this is not the only question to ask,84 it is important to
consider which groups have been lobbying (literally) 85 for limits on the
extent of civil discovery.
It is no secret that the anti-discovery pressure has come from defend-
ants, especially defendants in product liability, securities, and antitrust
cases.8 6 The most recent push for limits resembles the proposals of then-
Vice-President Quayle and the President's Council on Competitiveness. 87
In a 1991 speech to the American Bar Association, Vice-President
83. Marcus, supra note 4, at 773. As he explains:
In some instances those who seek to advance their interests through civil
litigation reform are overt about what they are doing, but many who seek
advantage through reform proposals do not act so transparently. Thus, skep-
ticism about hidden agendas sharpens our antennae as we scrutinize argu-
ments phrased as neutral .... [T]he real objective ... may be to become a
winner, not to achieve whatever loftier goals are invoked to justify the
change.
Id. at 772-73.
84. See infra Parts Ill(B) and IV.
85. Over the last decade, a variety of powerful "repeat players" have sought,
sometimes openly, to influence "court reform" efforts. By and large, that
work has been done not by letters written to the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules, but rather by lobbying efforts directed towards legislatures and
the public .... and by support for conferences and meetings to address and
describe the "litigation crisis."
Resnik, supra note 3, at 2219-20.
86. See Resnik, supra note 7, at 538.
The clients, particularly corporate clients, are demanding [constraint] as a
matter of costs, and Congress, concerned with the public outcry of excess
(although the facts do not support the extreme excess claims that are often
made) and reacting to the intensive lobbying efforts of segments of the busi-
ness community, has already acted.
Subrin, supra note 7, at 89.
87. The membership of the Council is not entirely clear. The Council's Civil Justice
Reform Working Group was chaired by then-Solicitor General Kenneth Starr. See Mul-
lenix, supra note 7, at 1422 n.151.
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Quayle announced the Council's recommendations for changing the civil
litigation system, with a focus on discovery. 88 The Council's Report,
called Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America, attacked discovery,
conflating tort liability and procedural issues, claiming that the decline of
the American economy was caused by the tort and products liability sys-
tem, which was caused by litigation transaction costs, which were caused
by the failings of the procedural rules.89 The Agenda "proposed revamp-
ing tort litigation and procedural rules in order to provide advantages to
business and the insurance industry. The agenda expressed little concern
with whether or not potential claims might be meritorious; rather, it em-
bodied a blatant attempt to modify the rules in order to frustrate plain-
tiffs' litigation." 90
Meanwhile, back in Congress, a crisis-slanted opinion poll conducted
by Louis Harris became the basis for the Brookings-Biden Report.91
Underwritten by business and insurance concerns, neither the Harris
survey nor the Brookings-Biden report considered alternative views
of the purposes of the federal justice system; instead, both concen-
trated on portraying procedural rules as mere adjuncts to the con-
cerns of American businessmen and insurance companies seeking to
secure the position of the United States within the global economy.92
The business community then appeared to testify in support of the Civil
Justice Reform Act (CJRA). 93 When the CJRA was passed by Congress,
pilot district advisory groups were directed to study discovery abuse and
were provided with copies of the Council's Agenda.
The Advisory Committee's current interest in discovery is a reflection
of the continued complaints from corporate constituents. Judge Paul V.
Niemeyer, of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, chaired his first meet-
ing of the Advisory Committee in October of 1996.94 Judge Niemeyer
made review of discovery the highest priority for the Committee. 95 He
88. See id. at 1401.
89. See id. at 1423.
90. Id. at 1424.
91. See id. at 1415. The problems with the methodology of the Harris opinion survey
are discussed generally in Mullenix, supra note 7, at 1410-15.
92. Id. at 1416-17.
93. See Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L.
REV. 375, 389-92, 397-98 (1992).
94. See Quagmire, supra note 50.
95. See id. Judge Niemeyer was appointed to the District Court bench in 1988 and to
the Fourth Circuit in 1990. From his graduation from law school through his appointment
to the district court, Niemeyer worked for the Baltimore firm of Piper & Marbury. See
Niemeyer Gets Bush Nod for 4th Circuit, UPI, Aug. 8, 1990, available in LEXIS, News
Library, UPI file; Terence Moran, Bush Judge Appointments: White, Male and Cautious,
CONN. L. TRIB., Feb. 4, 1991, at 2. Piper & Marbury describes itself in Martindale-Hubbell
as a "business law firm" whose clients include "many Fortune 500 industrial and service
companies; manufacturing and financial services companies; major investment banks and
investment advisers; venture capital organizations and emerging companies; overseas
banking and financial interests; regional and local businesses and commercial banks;
closely-held enterprises; and state and local governments." MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, PIPER
& MARBURY L.L.P. (1998). Its litigation specialties include commercial litigation, interna-
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acted in response to "longstanding concerns" about discovery abuse.96
Judge Niemeyer also "spoke eloquently about the depth of dissatisfaction
with discovery" and repeated the claim that discovery "accounts for 80
percent of litigation costs. '97 Reflecting on his own experience as an at-
torney, Niemeyer reported that he "knew all the tricks" and that "we
used to shuffle the documents. 98
At a conference at Boston College Law School in the fall of 1997, the
Committee had the chance to consider reports from various groups on
the issue of discovery reform. The plaintiff-based Association of Trial
Lawyers of America reported that discovery abuse is "rare" and recom-
mended against changes in the rules,99 and Trial Lawyers for Public Jus-
tice asserted that "there is no serious, scholarly empirical work to justify
system-wide restrictions upon discovery."' 00 The American College of
Trial Lawyers,101 on the other hand, proposed narrowing the scope of
discovery in the way that the Committee has recommended. 10 2 This pro-
posal was backed by the Defense Research Institute, which also called for
replacing automatic disclosure with an exchange of information such as a
narrative of the incident that led to the suit, legal claims and defenses,
and associated documents. 10 3
The kinds of amendments proposed by the Advisory Committee, then,
are those sought by groups that tend to appear in court as defendants and
tional trade litigation, labor and employment, products liability and toxic torts, securities
and business litigation, and white collar and public law litigation. See id.
96. Marcia Coyle, Discovery Rules to Be Re-Examined, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 10, 1997, at
A9. Alfred Cortese, a Philadelphia lawyer who represented "a broad coalition of business
groups opposed to mandatory pre-discovery disclosure in 1993," reacted favorably to the
Advisory Committee's announcement: "We are at a point where anything you ask for [dur-
ing discovery], you can get. It's terribly costly and unfair. Ultimately, the Rules Commit-
tee can do a lot of things that will help." Id.
97. Quagmire, supra note 50. This "80%"claim, for which there is no empirical sup-
port, is in fact contradicted by numerous empirical studies. See infra Part Ill(B). In his
introduction to the Boston College symposium, Judge Niemeyer reports the claim that
over 80% of the time and cost of lawsuits involves discovery. He goes on to note,
While I am not aware of any empirical data to support this claim, the fact
that the claim was made and is often repeated by others, many of whom are
users of the discovery rules, raises a question of whether the system pays too
high a price for the policy of full disclosure in civil litigation.
Niemeyer, supra note 38, at 518.
98. Quagmire, supra note 50. His personal anecdote thus reflects a practice of resist-
ance to discovery rather than one of overbroad discovery abuse.
99. See Rex Bossert, Many Suggest Changing the Nature of Discovery, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
13, 1997, at A12.
100. Id. "Paul Bland, a staff attorney at the Washington D.C.-based group, said the
biggest problem in discovery is 'stonewalling' by defendants who make lengthy and
groundless objections in depositions of witnesses or hide and even destroy documents." Id.
101. At least some commentators characterize the ACTL as dominated by defense in-
terests in civil cases. See Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages
and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1418 (1993); Lisa M. Agrimonti, Note, The
Limitations of Daubert and its Misapplication to Quasi-Scientific Experts, A Two-Year Case
Review of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 134, 153 n.93
(1995).
102. See Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer to Hon. Alicemarie H. Stotler (June 30,
1998), reprinted in 1998 Discovery Proposals, supra note 39, at 1.
103. See id.; see also Quagmire, supra note 50.
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by their lawyers. It is, however, possible that "a given proposal could,
regardless of its origin and its supporters, actually be justified on more
neutral grounds."'1 4 The remainder of this Article therefore focuses on
the necessity for and probable effect of the proposed amendments.
B. EMPIRICAL DATA AND THE NEED FOR CHANGE
Outcry about the cost and abuses of discovery is intimately connected
with outcry about the "litigation explosion." The notion that we are ex-
periencing a crisis in civil caseload was popularized by Walter K. Olson's
1991 book,105 politicized by the President's Council on Competitiveness
and fed by the media and by lawyers themselves.10 6 Careful empirical
analysis, particularly that of Professor Marc Galanter, has demonstrated
that no such crisis exists.' 0 7 This scholarly rebuttal, however, does not
seem to have made a dent in public perception. The same seems to be
true of concerns about problems with discovery. Public outcry and media
coverage continue to send the message that discovery is a gigantic and
pervasive problem. This part of the Article examines what empirical re-
search in fact indicates about discovery and the need, if any, for rule
changes.
The most recent study by the Federal Judicial Center succinctly sum-
marizes the findings of empirical researchers: "[Tihe typical case has rela-
tively little discovery, conducted at costs that are proportionate to the
stakes of the litigation, and ...discovery generally-but with notable
exceptions-yields information that aids in the just disposition of
cases." 08 This conclusion is supported by numerous studies going back
thirty years. The Columbia Project for Effective Justice, working in the
1960s, deliberately chose cases to maximize the likelihood of finding dis-
covery activity. Even within this group, only two-thirds of attorneys re-
ported using formal discovery.' 0 9 The researchers further concluded that
"the costs of discovery were not oppressive, either in relation to ability to
pay or to the stakes of litigation."' 1 0 Ten years later, the Federal Judicial
104. Marcus, supra note 4, at 773. Professor Marcus defines "neutrality" as "a perspec-
tive that is not driven by the self-interest of the observer (or of those the observer 'repre-
sents')" and in which "the choice is made on a basis of society-wide benefits." Id. at 773-
74.
105. WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN
AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991).
106. See Mullenix, supra note 7, at 1398-1409.
107. See generally Marc S. Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anectdote, 55
MD. L. REV. 1093 (1996); Marc S. Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on
Civil Justice, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 77 (1993); Marc S. Galanter, The Day After the Litiga-
tion Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986); Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of
Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly
Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 2 (1983).
108. Willging, supra note 71, at 527.
109. See McKenna, supra note 70, at 790 n.13. The Columbia researchers also found
that the percentage of litigation time spent on discovery was 43% for heavy discovery cases
but only 28-31% in the average case. See WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY
AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 71, 73, 196 (1968).
110. McKenna, supra note 70, at 787.
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Center (FJC) completed a significant study of discovery practices. This
project studied 3,000 federal civil cases from six metropolitan districts.'1 '
The FJC found that in 52% of the cases, there was no discovery at all. In
72% of the cases, there were no more than two discovery events.1 12 At
about the same time, the Civil Litigation Research Project (CLRP) at the
University of Wisconsin studied "ordinary litigation": cases in which
more than $1,000 is in controversy but excluding "mega" cases. The
CLRP found that "relatively little discovery occurs in the ordinary law-
suit. We found no evidence of discovery in over half our cases. Rarely
did the records reveal more than five separate discovery events. 1 1 3
These studies were consistent but dated. The Advisory Committee
therefore wisely looked to the RAND Institute for Civil Justice' 14 and
the Federal Judicial Center 1 5 for information about the current discovery
environment. The findings of both groups were consistent with the older
studies. The RAND study was based on 5222 cases filed in 1992-93 in
twenty federal districts.' 16 RAND excluded from its sample cases that
usually involve little or no discovery or management.11 7 In cases that
closed before issue was joined (28% of the sample), there was no discov-
ery at all. In cases that closed after issue was joined but in 270 days or
less (27% of the sample), the median lawyer work hours on discovery per
litigant was a whopping three hours. Even in cases that closed more than
270 days after filing (45% of the sample), lawyers worked a median of
twenty hours on discovery per litigant. Fifty-five percent of the RAND
sample, then, involved little or no discovery. 1 8 For 38% of general civil
cases, lawyer work hours for discovery were zero.119
The FJC studied 1000 cases closed in the last quarter of 1996 and strove
to sample cases likely to involve discovery.1 20 The FJC focused on costs
as reported by the attorneys in the cases studied. They found that the
median cost of discovery was about $6,500 per client (about half of me-
dian litigation costs). Relative to stakes, the FJC found that discovery
expenses were quite low. The median percentage was 3% of the
111. See generally PAUL R. CONNOLLY ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, JUDICIAL
CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY (1978).
112. See id. at 28-29.
113. David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 90
(1983). The study found that discovery occupied 16.7% of total lawyer time or a little more
than five hours. There were discovery events in 46.1% of the cases. See id. at 89-91. The
CLRP study included both state and federal cases. See id. at 75.
114. See James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil
Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 615 (1998).
115. See Willging, supra note 71 (reporting the FJC findings).
116. See Kakalik, supra note 114, at 618.
117. They excluded prisoner cases, administrative review of social security cases, bank-
ruptcy appeals, foreclosures, forfeiture and penalty cases, and debt recovery. See id. at 620
n.7. Such cases make up a substantial proportion of the federal courts' civil docket.
118. See id. at 635-36.
119. See id. at 636.
120. The FJC study excluded social security appeals, student loan collections, foreclo-
sures, default judgments, and cases terminated within sixty days of filing. See Willging,




Despite consistent findings of low discovery cost and a functioning sys-
tem, however, the studies are also consistent in finding a small percentage
of cases in which there is a larger volume of discovery activity and discov-
ery disputes. The 1978 FJC study concluded that a few cases-less than
five percent-had more than ten discovery requests. 122 The two modern
studies also discovered a large amount of discovery concentrated in a
small number of cases. For example, in the RAND study, the median
number of discovery hours in the top 10% of cases was 300-fifteen times
the median for discovery of the active cases.123 In the FJC study, while
the median percentage of discovery expenses to stakes was quite low
(3%), about 5% of attorneys estimated discovery expenses at 32% or
more of the amount at stake. 124 As the Director of the American Bar
Foundation reminds us, "[a] rather small number of cases thus generated
a very large amount of discovery.' 25
At least at a level of generality, the research has also identified charac-
teristics that tend to be associated with this small percentage of problem-
atic cases. These include amount at stake, case complexity, case
contentiousness, subject matter of the lawsuit, size of law firm, number of
parties, and number of claims, with the amount at stake having the
strongest correlation with discovery problems.' 26 The consistency of
these findings led the RAND researchers to recommend special attention
to the small number of problem cases:
These findings suggest that policymakers should consider focusing
discovery rule changes and discovery management on the types of
cases likely to have high discovery costs, and the discovery practices
that are likely to generate those high costs. More attention and re-
search is clearly needed on how to identify those high discovery cost
cases early in their life, and how best to manage discovery on those
cases.
127
Similarly, the FJC researchers were led by their data to theorize that
"there may be problem cases rather than isolated problems with each
121. See id. at 531.
122. See CONNOLLY, supra note 111, at 28.
123. See Bryant G. Garth, Two Worlds of Civil Discovery: From Studies of Cost and
Delay to the Markets in Legal Services and Legal Reform, 39 B.C. L. REV. 597, 600 (1998).
For this top ten percent, as in all the groups, the mean number is even higher-601 hours
for discovery. See id.
124. See Willging, supra note 71, at 531.
125. Garth, supra note 123, at 600.
126. See Willging, supra note 71, at 552, 555, 577, 582; Kakalik, supra note 114, at 668;
CONNOLLY, supra note 111, at 28-29. While the 1978 FJC study identified product liability,
patent, and franchise contract litigation as being the most likely to produce a high volume
of discovery, the 1998 FJC study results show antitrust, patent, securities, and trademark
cases to be most likely to generate large amounts of discovery. The new studies showed
the strongest predictor of discovery problems to be high stakes. The FJC researchers fur-
ther theorize that "[h]igh stakes cases may have more problems simply because they offer
more discovery activity and, hence, more opportunities for problems to arise." Willging,
supra note 71, at 555.
127. Kakalik, supra note 114, at 636-37.
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separate form of discovery.' 28
What we do not know is why these particular cases generate a large
volume of discovery and discovery disputes. What exactly are the
problems? And are the problems caused by the rules or by forces outside
the rules? What are the incentives for lawyers, clients, and judges that
cause problems to arise and to have persisted over time? Can these situa-
tions be addressed by rule changes? The next section of this article evalu-
ates the proposed discovery rule amendments in light of this knowledge
and this ignorance.
IV. EVALUATING THE PROPOSALS: BEYOND THE POWER
OF RULES
As noted in Part I above, the Advisory Committee has recommended a
set of rule changes that would universalize but restrict initial disclosures,
redefine the scope of discovery, re-emphasize the existing proportionality
limits, retain numerical limits on discovery devices, and introduce a new
time limit for depositions. These changes apply across the board, except
that certain kinds of predictably low-discovery cases are exempted from
automatic disclosure requirements. The Committee hopes that these
amendments would result in full disclosure of relevant information at less
cost, help the courts target problematic cases, and keep Congress out of
rulemaking. I fear that the actual impact would be the opposite: less ade-
quate disclosure of information, greater cost, problematic cases still prob-
lematic, and Congress still lurking.
A. DECREASED INFORMATION EXCHANGE
All of the proposed changes have the potential to limit the total
amount of information available to litigants through the disclosure and
discovery process. Disclosure of less information is not an explicit goal of
reform, however. Empirical research indicates that attorneys generally
believe that discovery generates about the right amount of information or
even too little information. 129
The first change likely to decrease the information flow comes in the
automatic disclosure rules. The proposals eliminate the requirement that
information be automatically disclosed under Rule 26(a) unless it sup-
ports the discloser's claim or defense. While this is a politically under-
standable response to the vehement opposition of the defense bar to
automatic disclosure, it is also apt to result in the disclosure of less infor-
mation both initially and after formal discovery.
The proposed amendments retain many of the features of which plain-
tiffs complained: the tie to possible Rule 11 sanctions, the specificity
128. Willging, supra note 71, at 553.
129. See Willging, supra note 71, at 531 (80% thought discovery generated about the




about damage calculations, the strategic value to an obstructionist de-
fendant of advance knowledge of the limits of plaintiff's pre-suit informa-
tion, and the limits on other formal discovery.130 Conversely, the
proposals delete the feature of initial disclosure that defendants most op-
posed: the need to disclose information that undermined claims or
defenses.131
One could argue that the limitation on initial disclosure merely shifts
the revelation of unfavorable information back to the formal discovery
process. But remember that the 1993 introduction of the disclosure rules
came with a trade-off-limits on formal discovery. As Professor Car-
rington notes, "disclosure requirements ... justif[ied] presumptive limits
on the amount of discovery that would be allowed. u 32 Without disclo-
sure, the limits
posed a threat to meritorious claims and defenses that are dependent
on extensive use of discovery. Earlier disclosure of the most obvi-
ously pertinent information facilitated intelligent setting of those
limits and made it less likely that meritorious contentions would be
lost as a result of premature and arbitrary limits on discovery. 133
Magistrate Brazil, in some sense the parent of automatic disclosure,
urged the Advisory Committee not to limit disclosure to supporting docu-
ments only:
[I]f you're thinking about a system where you're going to use disclo-
sure as basically a rationale for cutting back on the scope of discov-
ery, even document discovery, please make sure that you at least
think hard about whether the disclosure has to include adverse docu-
ments. Because one of the proposals is that the disclosure should be
limited to supporting documents. And if you do that and cut back on
other kinds of presumptive access to other kinds of discovery, I think
you're going to defeat your purpose. 134
130. The amendments do, however, eliminate the tie between pleading with particular-
ity and the availability of disclosure. This change should work in favor of plaintiffs to the
extent that it broadens the subjects on which defendants will have a duty to disclose. How-
ever, it limits that disclosure to information in support of the defendant's position. And
while this theoretically puts defendants without a sufficient basis for a denial at risk of a
Rule 11 sanction, this seems statistically unlikely based on past practices and based on the
courts' probable forgiveness of defendants who have had a short time to investigate and
prepare an answer and disclosures.
131. To be fair, the plaintiffs' bar was not crazy about this requirement either as applied
to them. At least where defendants' denial or affirmative defenses were specifically
pleaded, the current version of Rule 26(a)(1) could require plaintiffs to disclose documents
or witnesses who could show the plaintiff's claim to be unavailing. For a discussion of
attorneys' general aversion to disclosing information harmful to a client, see Sorenson,
supra note 16.
132. Carrington, supra note 7, at 305. This tie was made clear in the Committee Notes
to the 1993 amendments. For example, the new limit on number of interrogatories was
specifically justified by the disclosure requirements: "Revision of this subdivision limits
interrogatory practice. Because Rule 26(a)(l)-(3) requires disclosure of much of the infor-
mation previously obtained by this form of discovery, there should be less occasion to use
it." 1991 Draft, supra note 16, at 124.
133. Carrington, supra note 7, at 305.
134. Alumni Panel, supra note 34, at 835.
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The re-definition of relevance in Rule 26(b)(2) might also lead to a
decrease in the flow of information through discovery. It is possible that
the change could be innocuous. Some procedure experts have opined
that, on its face, the deletion of the "subject matter" language makes no
difference because the "subject matter" language is not a source of dis-
covery problems. 135 It seems more likely, though, that the changes, par-
ticularly when considered as a package, send a strong message to district
judges that the rulemakers want judges to exercise their discretion to re-
strict discovery. The Committee, after all, is recommending deleting the
"subject matter" language and limiting the last sentence about "reason-
ably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence" and ad-
ding a cross reference to a section limiting discovery. 136 Further, the
Committee Notes demonstrate that the Committee intends to signal "the
court that it has the authority to confine discovery.' 37 It seems unlikely
that district judges will fail to get their cue. As Professor Arthur Miller
pointed out to the Advisory Committee:
[R]atcheting back on the scope provision in any form would be a
monumental signal to the profession. The consequences you would
get by doing that would have more to do with people reading tea
leaves and saying, my God, this idea has been kicking around for
twenty years. Suddenly they put it into the rule. As a strict construc-
tionist or plain meaning person, I've got to give it effect. 138
The amended rule turns current presumptions on their head. Instead
of assuming that any matter relevant to the subject matter is discoverable,
with the burden on the party opposing discovery to show non-relevance,
burden, or privilege, the presumption is that information beyond "claims
and defenses" is not discoverable. The burden is newly placed on the
party seeking discovery either to convince the judge that the information
sought falls within the core definition of relevance or to make an unde-
135. See, e.g., Edward Cooper, The Discovery Reform Proposals 5-7 (Oct. 1996) (on file
with author); Paul Carrington, quoted in Alumni Panel, supra note 34, at 832. The same
skepticism met the original scope proposal. Professor Charles Alan Wright argued that
"[n]either the Section [of Litigation] nor the Advisory Committee offers a scintilla of proof
that the term 'subject matter' does in fact persuade courts to err on the side of expansion
of discovery." Marcus, supra note 2, at 758. Lacking any reliable empirical evidence that
the "subject matter" language causes problems, the Committee Notes merely assert that
the Committee has "heard" that in some instances the language has supported sweeping
requests. If in fact the changed language makes little difference, the Committee will have
increased the likelihood of disputes without any offsetting benefit. See infra Part IV(B).
136. 1998 Discovery Proposals, supra note 39, at 41-42 (Rule 26, lines 121-138).
137. Id. at 56. Even passing the changes must lead to the conclusion that some kind of
limit was the goal. Rule 26(b)(2) as amended would create a basic discovery standard of
relevant to the pleaded claims and defenses, with "subject matter" a different standard,
accessible only through motion and showing of good cause. Clearly some difference be-
tween the two standards is intended. Presumably the difference is meant to limit discovery
into related but unpleaded claims. However, as Professor Cooper has pointed out, this
would involve a major change in the philosophy of discovery. "Discovery is designed not
only to support or refute issues defined in the pleadings, but to continue the process of
refining the issues framed by the pleadings, discarding some of these issues, and adding
new issues." Cooper, supra note 135, at 6.
138. Alumni Panel, supra note 34, at 833.
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fined and "flexible" showing that there is good cause to allow further
discovery. The matter must go to the judge, and it must go to the judge
with a presumption against discovery. Further, these decisions about rel-
evance are extremely discretionary and virtually unreviewable. 139 Deni-
als of discovery may be consciously or unconsciously shaped by the
political views of those federal district judges who have been chosen spe-
cifically for their conservative views and are probably unreceptive to cer-
tain kinds of lawsuits. 140
Parties with incentives to resist discovery will also likely get their cue.
For example, products liability defendants now have added reasons to
read requests narrowly. Perhaps they will interpret the plaintiff's discov-
ery request in light of the "claims and defenses" language and, without an
overt objection, simply produce less information. There is little sanction
for a party withholding information that hurts that party so long as it is
never discovered. Inability to introduce the information at trial, Rule
37's answer, does not hurt the party who never wanted the information
revealed to begin with.
Finally, the new presumptive limit on length of depositions is, on its
face, a way of limiting discovery. While many depositions may already be
less than seven hours long, the Federal Judicial Center study found that a
six-hour limit (proposed but withdrawn in 1993) would have affected 30%
of the cases studied. 141 Absent party agreement, then, a party seeking
discovery through depositions faces the prospect of less information or, at
minimum, the increased cost and delay of filing a motion to allow a
longer deposition, justified by a vague good cause standard. 142 In the
kind of case in which problems occur, that party's opponent has also just
been handed an incentive to subtly run out the clock to further restrict
the time allowed.
The Committee's proposal leaves the information-poor litigant in this
box: (1) provided through the disclosure process only with information
that helps her opponent; 143 (2) provided with a shrunken set of formal
discovery tools to force the disclosure of information that helps her, but
139. For a discussion of review of discovery orders generally, see Elizabeth Thornburg,
Interlocutory Review of Discovery Orders: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 44 Sw. L.J.
1045 (1990).
140. See generally Thomas E. Shakow, Book Note, Picking Moderate Judges, 107 YALE
L.J. 2333 (1998) (reviewing SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER
COURT SELECrION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997)); Carl Tobias, Rethinking
Federal Judicial Selection, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1257. See also Andrew I. Gavil, Attitudinal
Discretion and the Prospects for Reinvigorating Antitrust: A Look at the New Federal Rules,
39 ANTITRUST BULL. 27 (1994) (arguing that assigning discretion to conservative trial
judges under the federal rules renders it likely that such discretion will work to plaintiffs'
detriment in antitrust cases).
141. See Willging, supra note 71, at 571.
142. Nor were the researchers able to document any benefit resulting from a deposition
time limit. See id. at 571 n.58.
143. The disclosing party will have to identify neither persons nor documents support-
ing an opponent's contentions. Formal discovery will still be needed for those tasks.
Given the trial bar's propensity to read interrogatories and document requests narrowly so
as to avoid identifying such people or producing such documents, the presumptive limits
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hurts her opponent; (3) required, at a minimum, to spend more money
and time, in the form of motions to show good cause, to get that informa-
tion;1 44 and (4) required to show good cause about information she can-
not concretely describe because she does not know precisely what it is,
who has it, or if it, in fact, exists. If that information-poor litigant has the
burden of proof in the lawsuit, she may also find herself on the losing end
of a summary judgment motion.145 If the case goes to trial, it may do so
without important information. 46
When considering the probability of a limited information exchange, it
is important to note that the Committee is not dealing with an isolated
procedural issue. Rather, the level of discovery is inextricably related to
the level of enforcement of various substantive legal norms. Much of the
regulation of conduct in America is done not by government agencies but
indirectly, through a series of private lawsuits or the fear of those
lawsuits:
We should keep clearly in mind that discovery is the American alter-
native to the administrative state. We have by means of Rules 26-
37 ... privatized a great deal of our law enforcement, especially in
such fields as antitrust and trade regulation,.., civil rights, and intel-
lectual property. Private litigants do in America much of what is
done in other industrial states by public officers working within an
administrative bureaucracy. Every day, hundreds of American law-
yers caution their clients that an unlawful course of conduct will be
accompanied by serious risk of exposure at the hands of some hun-
dreds of thousands of lawyers, each armed with a subpoena power by
which misdeeds can be uncovered. Unless corresponding new pow-
ers are conferred on public officers, constricting discovery would di-
minish the disincentives for lawless behavior across a wide spectrum
may create a real barrier to full disclosure of information. This is especially likely where
initial disclosure will have demonstrated the limits of an opponent's existing knowledge.
144. The discovering party must file a motion and show good cause both to seek discov-
ery that her opponent believes is beyond the "claims and defenses" limit and to undertake
discovery in excess of the presumptive limits on number and duration. She may also have
to contend with a motion to shift the cost of document production to her if her opponent
claims that the cost of such production exceeds a suitable limit under Rule 26(b)(2).
145. See Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1927
(1998) ("The most obvious ways in which courts can deploy Rule 56 to intercept cases
before trial are first by setting a vigorous standard for permitting plaintiffs discovery before
summary judgment, and then, at summary judgment, by using a tough standard for estab-
lishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact."); see also Alumni Panel, supra
note 34, at 833 (quoting Professor Miller):
There are many things going on in our world outside of discovery whether
it's some of these heightened pleading barriers, whether it's the advancement
from trial to summary judgment, and then from summary judgment to the
12(b)(6). We are seeing movements and disposition that we would have
thought unthinkable ten years ago. These are having serious access conse-
quences. That's a deeply philosophical, mega-issue in terms of the Americanjustice system, which I think should never be forgotten by the Committee.
Id.
146. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 135, at 3 ("The alternative to complex trials based on




of forbidden conduct. 147
The tie between discovery and enforcement is no coincidence, and as-
suredly not a surprise to those groups seeking change.148 Business groups
seek to limit discovery precisely because those limits will make it more
difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in products liability suits. 149 Having failed
to pass substantive tort reform legislation, these groups seek procedural
advantage; if the law cannot be changed, maybe it can be made unen-
forceable. 50 There may also be a specific tie to notice pleading and dis-
covery, a feeling that only the most egregious and easily-discovered
violations of substantive law should be prevented or remedied: "it is bet-
ter for society that obscure and well-buried wrongs lie undisturbed.' 15 1 If
the Advisory Committee does not share this view, it should be deeply
concerned about the possible impact of the proposed rule amendments.
B. CONTINUED AND INCREASED TRANSACTION COSTS
If taken as a philosophical signal by trial judges, the discovery amend-
ments might result in the exchange of less information. It is unlikely,
however, that they will result in meaningfully decreased costs. First,
there will continue to be a large quantity of discoverable information in
the very kinds of cases that lead to controversy about discovery. "[T]here
can be no inexpensive way to investigate and decide complex issues of
fact such as those entailed in fixing moral responsibility for misfortunes
and assessing damages tailored to individual circumstances. ' 152 In these
147. Carrington, supra note 6, at 54; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., quoted in Cooper,
supra note 135, at 18 ("Civil claims are an integral part of law enforcement in this coun-
try.... Liberal discovery is an integral part of effective enforcement .... Hence, the scope
of discovery determines the scope of effective law enforcement in many fields regulated by
law."); see also Patrick Higginbotham, Foreward, 49 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1997).
148. For a discussion of the sources of pressure to limit discovery, see supra Part Ill(A).
149. For a discussion of the reasons that limits on discovery tend to disadvantage plain-
tiffs as compared to defendants, see Elizabeth Thornburg, Rethinking Work Product, 77
VA. L. REV. 1515, 1561-71 (1991) and authorities cited therein. See also Marcus, supra
note 2, at 749 ("It seems undeniable that broad discovery has benefitted plaintiffs attempt-
ing to prove certain types of claims by enabling them to obtain both 'smoking guns' and
less inflammatory but critical evidence. The great importance of discovery to some plain-
tiffs is obvious.").
150. Carrington, supra note 6, at 53 ("Much of the hoopla about litigation costs may be
traceable to those whose real complaint is that they or their clients are exposed to liabili-
ties that they would prefer to avoid. Theirs is a disguised outcry for tort reform.");
Sugarman & Perlin, supra note 7, at 1468-69.
In its broadest sense.... the tort reform movement seeks a reexamination of
what its proponents believe to be an unfair burden imposed on American
industry by injured consumers. With that in mind, it is not surprising that
most of the Council [on Competitiveness]'s proposals seek to limit or im-
pede, through the judicial process, a plaintiffs recovery in product liability
cases and as such are enthusiastically endorsed by the American Tort Reform
Association.
Id.
151. Cooper, supra note 135, at 3 ("These views do not seem a promising foundation
for discovery reform.").
152. Carrington, supra note 7, at 303. Actually, you could cut down considerably on
transaction costs by substituting a coin flip and a damages dart board for civil litigation, but
I doubt that such a trade-off would be acceptable to anyone.
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days of computers, printers, and copiers there is simply a lot of paper
created and stored. We have only seen the tip of the iceberg in terms of
the procedural consequences of electronic storage and retrieval of
data. 153 Nor is non-documentary discovery easily confined. Litigation in-
volving large business or government entities requires sifting through
large numbers of potential witnesses to locate the ones with relevant in-
formation, especially information helpful to the discovering party. 154 In
addition, the breadth of the rules of trial evidence means that a large
quantity of information is going to be relevant in the trial sense and
therefore admissible. 155 The need for the evidence at trial creates the
need for the information during discovery. It may be that the reason the
Rule 26(b)(2) proportionality limits have not been cited often is that pro-
portionality principles are not often violated; certain kinds of civil litiga-
tion simply require large quantities of discovery, and these amounts are
not disproportionate to the stakes involved and not unnecessarily dupli-
cative or burdensome.1 56
Second, the forces that currently lead to misunderstandings and dis-
putes about discovery still exist. I will take a product liability case as an
example because that is likely to be an area on which litigants' hopes and
fears about these proposals focus. One ongoing source of disputes is a
difference in fundamental outlook between the plaintiff and defense bars.
These differences will be reflected in disagreements about relevance even
under the proposed amended Rule 26(b)(1). For example, assume a law-
suit that grows out of personal injury caused by some particular product.
The plaintiffs' bar is likely to believe that information surrounding that
product and similar products, including numerous prior and subsequent
model years, including many different types of injuries, and including
many possible design or manufacturing defects in that product, are all
covered by the "claims and defenses" language of the discovery relevance
rule. Defense lawyers, on the other hand, are likely to interpret "relevant
to the claims and defenses" to mean that they need disclose information
only about the particular product causing the particular kind of harm.
While we may have eliminated fights about totally unrelated products,
the new rules do not answer this kind of question and will not stop the
disputes.
Third, this difference in outlook is fueled by the parties' strategic
needs: plaintiff wants to get as much information as possible in order to
153. See, e.g., Geanne Rosenberg, Electronic Discovery Proves an Effective Legal
Weapon, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1997, at D5.
154. And more businesses are suing each other all the time. See Marc Galanter, The
Life and Times of the Big Six; or, The Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days, 1988 Wis.
L. REv. 921, 942-46 (discussing growth of commercial litigation in federal courts between
1960 and 1986).
155. See Cooper, supra note 135, at 3.
156. This is likely to be particularly true in that small percentage of cases that generates
significant amounts of discovery and discovery disputes. Also, in some of these cases in-
volving large amounts of intangible, non-market damages, it may be hard to estimate what
the "stakes" are when trying to make decisions about the costs of discovery.
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meet her burden of proof, and defendant wants to keep plaintiff from
getting it. Plaintiffs draft discovery requests that are of necessity some-
what broad and somewhat vague; 57 they do not know specifically what
documents exist, and they fear narrow and evasive responses. Defend-
ants resent what they see as overbroad, expensive, and irrelevant re-
quests. Both sides may have something to gain from the stereotypical
"abusive" practices. Plaintiffs may get settlement leverage out of creating
litigation expenses for defendants, who settle to minimize out of pocket
costs. Defendants, in turn, may get settlement leverage out of creating
expense and delay for plaintiffs who settle because they (and/or their law-
yers) cannot afford the costs of the discovery disputes or the delay in
payment. 58 To make matters worse, there is an extremely high level of
distrust between the two groups of lawyers. Professor Tom Rowe, a
member of the Advisory Committee, noted after listening to the groups
at the Boston College symposium that "the levels of mistrust and antago-
nism between them even among elite lawyers are distressingly high. (I
came away wondering if those people were at the point of trying to pre-
vent intermarriage among their children!)" 159 These attitudes make it
likely that plaintiffs' lawyers will continue to try to draft broad requests
that are impervious to evasion through narrow interpretation, and that
defendants' lawyers will continue to resist producing what they see as a
mountain of marginally relevant information.
The very existence of rule amendments will create new opportunities
for discovery disputes. We now have years of case law about the meaning
of "relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether
it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the
claim or defense of any other party.' 160 We do not know, however, the
meaning of "relevant to the claim or defense of any party," especially as
contrasted with "information relevant to the subject matter of the ac-
tion.' 161 The Committee Notes concede that this new distinction is
vague: "[t]he dividing line between information relevant to the claims and
defenses and that relevant only to the subject matter of the action cannot
be defined with precision."'1 62
It seems likely that this necessary lack of clarity will foster exactly the
kinds of disputes discussed above. For example, in a lawsuit about post-
crash injuries following a head-on collision and allegedly caused by the
design of a 1990 Chevrolet, do inquiries about the 1989 model relate to
157. Cf. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REv.
1665, 1675 (1998) ("[T]he clues that can be sifted from a set of documents cannot be pre-
dicted without seeing the set of documents.").
158. For a good example of the parties' differing diagnoses of the causes of problem
discovery, see David Wagner, Lawyers "Discover" How to Beat the Rap, INSIGH-T ON THE
NEWS, Dec. 15, 1997, at 31 (discussing DRI conference on discovery).
159. Email from Tom Rowe to Law Faculty Discussion List of Civil Procedure, Civ-
Pro@law.wisc.edu (Sept. 10, 1997) (on file with author).
160. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
161. 1998 Discovery Proposals, supra note 39, at 41-42 (Rule 26, lines 123-26, 131-32).
162. Id. at 56.
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the claims and defenses in the lawsuit? What about crash tests involving
side collisions? What about an almost-identical Oldsmobile?
There will also be uncertainty about discovery sought for purposes such
as impeachment. As attorney Gregory Joseph asked the Alumni Panel at
Boston College: "You take the American College proposal, limit it to rel-
evant to the claim or defense. Here's a situation. The party six years ago
was convicted of perjury. Is that discoverable?" 163 Arthur Miller, re-
sponding without answering the question, as all good law professors do,
predicted that questions such as this "might breed a hell of a lot of mo-
tion practice.' 164
Beyond the question of the line between "claim or defense" and "sub-
ject matter" lies the next step in the proposed process: showing good
cause. What, exactly, is good cause to go beyond whatever its "claims
and defenses" are? These decisions are likely to be highly discretionary
and extremely case-specific. The Committee Notes state that the stan-
dard is "meant to be flexible."'1 65 They further explain that "the actual
scope of discovery should be determined according to the reasonable
needs of the action. The court may permit broader discovery in a particu-
lar case depending on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the
claims and defenses, and the scope of the discovery requested. 1 66 This
non-standard layers uncertainty on top of uncertainty and is begging to
be repeatedly litigated. Further, it is not likely to generate caselaw over
time that provides guidance to litigants and decreases the flow of
disputes.
To the new uncertainty, add incentives to litigate. The new rules create
additional incentives for defendants to resist discovery. 167 First, they may
correctly deduce that discovery requested is no longer available. Second,
even if it turns out that the material was discoverable after all, they have
forced the plaintiff to invest greater time and money in acquiring the in-
formation. At minimum, the plaintiff had to file a motion to compel dis-
covery. The motion may have required a hearing, possibly even an
evidentiary hearing. And there may have been considerable delay be-
tween the filing of the motion and the court's ruling. Finally, the uncer-
tainty of the new rules' meaning may lead the court to conclude that the
defendant's resistance to discovery was substantially justified1 68 and so no
163. Alumni Panel, supra note 34, at 832.
164. Id. at 833; see also id. at 813 (quoting John Frank: "[W]e'll simply be starting a
whole new war over what does it mean and what is the change. And it's just going to cost
money and not do much good.").
165. 1998 Discovery Proposals, supra note 39, at 56.
166. Id.
167.
[Y]ou will create incentives for friction, create incentives for people to resist.
And one of the big problems with discovery is there's a lot of friction in it.
And be careful of writing rules that give people incentives to resist, because
it's not clear that the most fundamental problem isn't resistance.
Wayne Brazil, quoted in Alumni Panel, supra note 34, at 834.
168. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).
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sanctions will be forthcoming to offset the cost of the discovery dispute.
The proposed amendments also do not, and probably cannot, address
incentives to misuse the discovery process that exist outside of the litiga-
tion process itself. We do not, at this point in time, have reliable informa-
tion about what those forces are.169 There seem to be some likely
candidates, however. One source of pressure to over-do or resist discov-
ery, to cooperate or to wage all out war,170 may come from clients. Dis-
covery, especially extensive discovery, is not pleasant for any client and
those clients may resist discovery or not try very hard to locate all rele-
vant information.' 7' More intractable, some clients may want discovery
disputes. "[T]here are still cases.., where businesses are willing to invest
in full-scale warfare, and for those cases they turn to the elite litigators
who are now very well-trained and well-armed."' 72 While clients may be
deluded, 173 it is more likely that sophisticated clients are deliberately
choosing lawyers who fight rather than cooperate. 174 If there are in fact
client incentives to create disputes,' 75 these incentives remain untouched
by the amended rules. Until we know why these clients make these
choices, we will not know what kind of change in the rules, if any, can
help force changed behavior.
A similar problem exists with regard to lawyers themselves. Some dis-
putes may be due to simple incompetence or misunderstanding of the
rules. Others may be an outgrowth of adversary culture. Empirical data
seems to link problematic behavior with larger law firms. The FJC study,
for example, found that costs were higher when one of the law firms in-
volved in the case had more than eleven lawyers.176 Is there something
169. Bryant Garth, Director of the American Bar Foundation, has suggested that ques-
tions such as this are crucial to dealing with the issue of highly contentious lawsuits.
[W]e can only gain limited insights from research that starts with the ques-
tions of cost and delay and ends with the same questions.... The reasons for
the external pressures must also be studied .... The best way to save judicial
cost and time, in fact, may be to look at incentives for behavior outside the
courts.
Bryant G. Garth, Observations on an Uncomfortable Relationship: Civil Procedure and
Empirical Research, 49 ALA. L. REV. 103, 128-29 (1997).
170. The very use of war and sports metaphors may reinforce attitudes that lead to
unnecessary discovery disputes. See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Metaphors Matter: How
Images of Battle, Sports, and Sex Shape the Adversary System, 10 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 225
(1995).
171. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 158 (describing attitude of engineer caught up in
discovery).
172. Garth, supra note 123, at 607.
173. And if so, then improved client education may accomplish more than rule changes.
See Kakalik, supra note 114, at 633.
174. See Garth, supra note 123, at 608-09.
175. Brazil's study of Chicago lawyers found that among the lawyers who specialized in
larger, more complex cases, clients were more likely to play an active role in discovery
decisions, to pressure lawyers to resist discovery, and to use discovery tools to harass oppo-
nents. See Brazil, supra note 70, at 859-60; see also McKenna, supra note 70, at 803-04.
176. See Willging, supra note 71, at 552.
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about the economics177 or culture 178 of law firms that contributes to dis-
covery disputes? If so, it is again unlikely that the proposed discovery
amendments will make any difference.
C. TARGETING THE BAD CASE
There is some indication that the Advisory Committee hopes that this
package of changes will result in directing judicial attention toward that
small percentage of cases with significant discovery problems. The Com-
mittee Notes to the relevance restrictions, for example, state that "the
amendment is designed to involve the court more actively in regulating
the breadth of discovery in cases involving sweeping or contentious dis-
covery."'1 79 Judge Niemeyer, the Chair of the Advisory Committee, simi-
larly expressed his intention to head toward a process that would
substantially leave in place, subject to attorney management, the
present discovery practice used for the vast majority of cases, and
would commit customized discovery to a procedure by which the
parties would have to develop a plan and submit it to the court for
approval. This would have the beneficial effect of engaging the court
in management over complex discovery where that management is
most needed.180
The Committee's impulse to urge greater judicial involvement is a good
one.181 Unfortunately, they have chosen a perverse way to get there.
Empirical research has demonstrated time and again that the ordinary
cases have few discovery disputes and work well. Yet the Committee has
proposed across-the-board amendments that change the rules in those
very situations that should be left alone. Apparently, the hope is that the
restricted scope of discovery and limited discovery tools will cause the
more difficult cases to pop themselves out of the stack and call them-
selves to the judge's attention. 182 I find it very hard to believe, however,
that the most horrific five percent of cases are not already characterized
by multiple motion filings. Those cases are already screaming for help in
the form of grown-up judicial supervision, which can be provided under
the broad powers of Rule 16 without making any changes to the rules.
The amendments seem more likely to increase the number of cases char-
177. For example, could the profitability of hourly billing coupled with pressure to max-
imize billable hours reward attorneys who engage in lengthy disputes rather than shorter
compliance? Could the need to train associates by assigning multiple lawyers to the same
tasks itself be a significant factor in costs? See also McKenna, supra note 70, at 802-03.
178. Do certain firms foster a reputation for scorched-earth litigation tactics? One arti-
cle, for example, contends that Williams & Connolly has and deserves such a reputation
and represented President Clinton accordingly. See Nancy Gibbs & Michael Duffy, The
Cost of It All, TIME, Aug. 24, 1998, at 36, 42 ("[T]hey litigate every case the same way, and
that's hardball. Give 'em nothing, tell 'em nothing, delay, fight at every turn.").
179. 1998 Discovery Proposals, supra note 39, at 55.
180. Niemeyer, supra note 38, at 524.
181. See supra Part 11(B) (regarding support for increased judicial supervision).
182. See Alumni Panel, supra note 34, at 826. "1 think what you can do is to create a




acterized by disputes and thereby decrease the amount of time that a dili-
gent district judge has to spend on any of them. It would be far better to
commission research to try to identify the factors that would help judges,
lawyers, and litigants predict in advance which cases are likely to cause
disputes and whether there is anything a rule amendment can do to help.
"[T]argeted problems call for targeted responses. If complex litigation is
the source of more problematic discovery practice, then rule reform
ought to be tailored to the universe of this particular litigation that in-
spires complaint. '183
In the meantime, courts already have plenty of tools to deal with high-
dispute cases. They can experiment with asking lawyers to designate
their cases as complex and request early planning and expedited rulings.
They can treat the first or second discovery motion as a clue that more
intensive judicial involvement will be required for a particular case. Once
difficult cases are identified, the discovery rules themselves provide au-
thority to make decisions about proportionality, compliance, and sanc-
tions. In addition, as noted above, Rule 16 allows significant flexibility in
regulating, conducting, and controlling discovery. 18 Additional sugges-
tions can be gleaned from sources such as the Manual on Complex Litiga-
tion. 18 5 The Committee can urge judges to use these methods on
complex, high stakes litigation, handled by big firms with corporate cli-
ents while seeking to discern whether anything else within the power of
the rulemakers is needed or likely to help.
D. AVOIDING CONGRESSIONAL INTERFERENCE
Despite empirical research, the advice of committee alumni, and their
own misgivings, 186 the Advisory Committee has proposed global changes
to the discovery rules. Part of the answer may be the judicial branch's
well-founded desire to hang on to control of rulemaking. Political forces
seeking changes in the procedure rules have already demonstrated their
willingness to go to Congress when they find the rules committee insuffi-
ciently responsive. And Congress has already demonstrated its willing-
ness to oblige.
183. Mullenix, supra note 10, at 686; see also Garth, supra note 123, at 605 ("The obvi-
ous danger.., is that reforms designed for the relatively few cases will impose burdens on
the more ordinary cases."); Alumni Panel, supra note 34, at 812. "It seems to me that the
Committee has to face the problem of the five percent or so, whatever that number is, of
cases that really need judicial handling, and get out of the way of the rest of them." Id.(quoting John Frank).
184. See Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are
the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1901, 1915 (1989)("[W]ith atten-
tive and firm management by a judge or magistrate, it is my experience and belief that
almost all discovery abuse can be controlled or prevented.").
185. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL ON COMPLEX LITIGATION (3d ed. 1995).
186. See Marcus, supra note 2, at 784 ("Given the scope of the changes to date, it sug-




In the midst of the Alumni Panel discussion at the Boston College con-
ference came this chilling reminder from Mark Gitenstein, who was Chief
Counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee when the CJRA was adopted:
I think the awkward position this Committee is in.. . is if you tinker
you always run the risk that Congress will totally ignore you and take
on the reform and procedural issues itself .... As long as big busi-
ness defendants feel that they are settling cases because of transac-
tion costs driven by discovery, you are going to face a serious
political problem on the Hill, and if you don't deal with it here, I
think the Hill eventually, Congress will eventually deal with it .... I
think also that if you're going to reject the American College's rec-
ommendations regarding scope, you have to have a very good reason
for doing that. If you're going to reject them ... you better have a
good explanation for it, because, if you don't do that, I suspect that
there will be people on the Hill who will try to amend your proposal
to put those ideas in there. So you need to address them and make a
compelling case against them ... or you're going to face that I think
on the Hill .... [W]hen interests come to the Hill, like the business
community, or the trial bar, and say you should look at this, they will
look at it. And I'm telling you that problem is getting serious
enough that it is going to happen. So they're definitely going to be
looking over your shoulder, not because they're naturally interested
in it ... [b]ut because people outside the Hill are going to be sure
they do.187
The prospect of congressional intervention is definitely on the minds of
procedure scholars. Professor Marcus, Reporter to the discovery sub-
committee and drafter of these proposals, has pointed out that "ulti-
mately the principal question is whether Congress will respect the pro-
cess. If it does not, a variety of winners in the legislative influence game
may begin to exercise considerable influence over rules they care about, a
development that would seem likely to make losers of us all." 188 Profes-
sor Linda Mullenix has warned that congressional involvement may result
in the Advisory Committee going "the way of the French aristocracy."1 89
The Committee, therefore, may be willing to make at least symbolic or
incremental changes, hoping to keep Congress at bay. For example, for-
mer Reporter Paul Carrington was willing to recommend the changes in
the scope proposal, which he thought to be ineffectual, "to buy a little
peace with people who care deeply about these things." 190 Former Re-
porter Arthur Miller commented to the Advisory Committee: "I don't
know how you function in this environment. I really don't. It's a prob-
lem not only that Congress is looking, that people are running to Con-
gress. That the Committee discussions often reflect political reality, and
decisions are made on that basis."1 91 Judge Niemeyer, the Advisory
187. Alumni Panel, supra note 34, at 824-26.
188. Marcus, supra note 4, at 818.
189. Mullenix, supra note 19, at 802.
190. Alumni Panel, supra note 34, at 831.
191. Id. at 837.
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Committee's Chair, closed the Boston College conference by looking to-
ward the political: "I think we have to recognize that ... we're before the
eyes of Congress, and whatever we do is going to have to be sellable to
this whole group, and to the public and Congress. And I think the Com-
mittee is fully aware of that new role." 192
The proposed amendments go part of the way toward giving the busi-
ness lobby what it asked for. They adopt the ACTL limits on the defini-
tion of scope. They cut back on the content of initial disclosure. They
remind the courts of their power to limit discovery and shift costs. Maybe
it will buy peace. But I doubt it. The proposals still require some auto-
matic disclosure without the ability to capitalize on an opponent's inept-
ness. They limit the basic scope of discovery but still allow a party to go
to the judge and ask for more. They allow cost shifting in document pro-
duction but only for production that violates the Rule 26(b)(2) propor-
tionality limits. They leave notice pleading alone,193 and without a
requirement that parties plead all causes of action with factual specificity,
the scope limits will not satisfy defendants who dislike expensive discov-
ery.' 94 If the 1998 proposals fend off Congress for now, they will only
have provided a fragile and temporary protection from future onslaughts.
Rather than offering partial capitulation, the Committee might defend
its turf and its beliefs. "The Advisory Committee is not entirely helpless.
In the past it has fought for its work product. ' 195 It can do so again, and
support its efforts with empirical research and educational programs.
V. CONCLUSION: WHAT'S A COMMITTEE TO DO?
The Advisory Committee is in a very hard place. Despite empirical
evidence to the contrary, its members are constantly besieged by com-
plaints about discovery. They are faced with Congress threatening to
meddle in rulemaking. And federal civil procedure has fallen into a dis-
uniformity that few would have imagined. The pressure to do something,
and do it now, must be unbearable. Nevertheless, my advice is to recon-
sider what that "something" should be. Now is not the time for rule
change, especially not uni-directional anti-discovery rule change.
The disuniformity created by the 1993 amendments is a serious prob-
lem. It has apparently even led districts to "opt out" of rules containing
no opt out clause. Differences in district rules have created new opportu-
192. id. at 840.
193. And the Advisory Committee has shown itself willing to at least discuss changes to
the pleading rules. See Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice,
76 TEX. L. REv. 1749, 1751 n.18 (1998).
194. Cf. Mark Gitenstein, quoted in Alumni Panel, supra note 34, at 824 ("1 think you
have no choice but to think globally and act globally, and I would not be shy about going
beyond the discovery rules if you think that is necessary."); Cooper, supra note 135, at 7
("A potentially more effective approach would be to limit discovery to matters relevant to
the issues framed by the pleadings. Since notice pleading often does not identify issues
with much clarity, thorough pursuit of this alternative would require a complete reworking
of notice pleading as well as discovery.").
195. Marcus, supra note 4, at 818.
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nities for forum shopping. Differences in duties and expectations must
frustrate clients and lawyers alike. Sixty percent of the attorneys sur-
veyed by the FJC reported that nonuniformity across districts creates
moderate to serious problems.196 Keep in mind, however, that dis-
uniformity was already a problem prior to the 1993 amendments. Local
rules had created significant differences in practice and requirements. 197
Further, the very discretionary nature of the federal rules themselves has
always meant that uniformity was something of an illusion.' 98 It is impor-
tant to act to increase uniformity, but not before there is adequate infor-
mation on which to act. Painful though it may be, the Committee would
be better advised to commission further empirical research before choos-
ing a procedure to make uniform.
The nature and feasibility of such research would, of course, have to be
formulated in consultation with social scientists. A few areas, however,
naturally suggest themselves:
Initial Disclosure. The RAND and FJC studies, considering different
kinds of disclosure at different time periods, arrived at inconsistent results
even about questions as fundamental as whether disclosure saved time.
More research is needed about how disclosure works in terms of effi-
ciency and in terms of information exchange. It is also not clear whether
these provisions have been genuinely implemented at the case level and
whether they have, or will, make an impact on lawyer behavior. While
there is a strong interest in creating a uniform rule, there is a complete
lack of consensus about what form that uniform rule should take. More
reliable and more nuanced information is needed before the Advisory
Committee is in a position to choose the direction for change. What kind
of information is being exchanged? How many disputes are there, and
about what? How does it affect formal discovery? Is there a tie to Rule
11 motions by either plaintiffs or defendants? Is it producing satellite
litigation? Is it merely substituting for certain standard interrogatories
and document production requests? In what kinds of cases does it save
time or expense and in what kinds of cases does it increase them? Is it
interfering with discovery privileges or with the duty of zealous
representation?
196. See Willging, supra note 71, at 542. Attorneys who practiced in four or more dis-
tricts were more likely to see the problems as serious.
197. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of Federal
Rules, 46 MERCER L. REV. 757 (1995); A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study
in the Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567 (1991); David M. Roberts, The Myth of
Uniformity in Federal Civil Procedure: Federal Civil Rule 83 and District Court Local
Rulemaking Powers, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 537 (1985); Stephen N. Subrin, Federal
Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Pat-
terns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999 (1989).
198. See Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal
Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 715 (1988). "Federal Rules that
avoid policy choices and that in essence chart ad hoc decision-making by trial judges are
uniform and hence trans-substantive in only the most trivial sense." Id.
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Discovery Limits. Where presumptive limits exist, what has been their
effect on discovery devices? Is there an impact on the number or inten-
sity of disputes? Is there an impact on the quantity or quality of informa-
tion available through discovery? Is there an impact on settlement or
case outcomes? In districts without the limits, with what frequency are
the various discovery devices used and to what effect? How often, and
under what circumstances, do the parties agree to waive the limits?
Scope of Discovery. Are there cases in which parties undertake discov-
ery clearly outside the scope of the pleadings? If so, how often? Is this
broad discovery tied to the "subject matter" language of Rule 26? What
kinds of disputes occur concerning the strength of the link between the
information requested and the claims to be proved? What is the impact
of the discoverability of information "reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence"?199 Is the quantity of discovery linked
to the shift in focus of civil litigation from pleadings to discovery, coupled
with the rules of evidence for trials, coupled with the requirements of
substantive law?
Subject-Specific Rules. Does there exist, in certain areas, a degree of
consensus about what constitutes clearly discoverable information, evi-
denced by problem-free discovery in repeated cases? If so, could stan-
dard interrogatories or document production requests be formulated for
those substantive areas and used as an initial disclosure requirement?
The Problem Cases. Do they share characteristics so that they can be
identified in advance? Can judges or attorneys accurately pre-select such
cases? What exactly are the problems-sheer quantity; overbroad dis-
covery; unfounded resistance to discovery; cost relative to stakes? Are
the problems caused or exacerbated by the procedure rules or by forces
outside the discovery process? 201
The Ordinary Case. What makes the discovery process work in those
cases that do not encounter problems? Do these cases have shared char-
acteristics in terms of stakes, subject matter, attorneys, clients, or other
dispute resolution methods?
Attorneys. Looking outside the rules themselves is also necessary. Are
there characteristics of law firms, practice specialties, billing methods, or
attorneys that tend to breed disputes? Are there provisions in rules of
professional responsibility that encourage non-cooperation? Are there
informal facets of legal culture that encourage abuses and, if so, where do
they come from? What incentives encourage attorneys to be particularly
adversarial? What incentives encourage them to cooperate? Does legal
education contribute to any of these forces?
Clients. Is there something about the incentive structure for clients
that causes them to choose non-cooperative litigation or to retain attor-
199. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
200. Such research would have to avoid the difficulties encountered by the FJC in try-
ing to study discovery abuse in Baltimore. Those problems are described in Mullenix,
supra note 7, at 1436-40.
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neys known to be "warriors"? Are there social or economic forces that
encourage clients to resist discovery, to undertake overly-broad discov-
ery, and to fight about discovery at every opportunity? What is the im-
pact of in-house counsel? How accurate is client information about
litigation? Do certain industries have informal rules that encourage con-
tentious litigation?
Judges. What are their incentives and disincentives to involve them-
selves in discovery and discovery disputes? Why have they not re-
sponded to repeated requests from attorneys for more aggressive
involvement? Do they have sufficient resources? What are they spend-
ing their time on? Are there constraints on their allocation of priorities?
Are there some judges who handle discovery matters better than others
and, if so, do they share certain characteristics? How are district judges
using magistrate judges and special masters in the discovery area?
When the Advisory Committee has received the answers to these, or
other, questions, it will be in a far better position to recommend changes,
if there are problems and if those identified problems can be addressed
by a rule.20' It will also know more about ways to encourage litigants and
judges to use the tools that are already available in order to help every-
one progress toward a just resolution of the lawsuit. More reliable infor-
mation about the roots of discovery abuse may indicate that, where
problems exist, they are the result of larger systemic problems such as
adversary system incentives and litigant resources. Such problems are be-
yond the power of the Advisory Committee.
In the meantime, hard as it is, the Committee should leave the rules
alone.
201. If the Advisory Committee has a particular rule change in mind, it would also be
wise to encourage empirical research on that very issue before going forward with the
change.
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